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Q

Fighting Confilcts of Interest in Officialdom: Constitutional
and Practical Guidelines for State Financial Disclosure
Laws

A "conflict of interest" may be defined as any circumstance in
which the personal interest of a public official in a matter before
him in his official capacity may prevent or appear to prevent him
from making an unbiased decision with respect to the matter.1 There
have been statutes dealing with conflicts of interest in the United
States at least since 1789,2 and at present nearly all states have some
conflict of interest statutes.3 Such statutes fall into two categories.
The older type either forbade officials from acting in conflict of interest or required them to disclose potential conflicts of interest
before letting a public contract or voting on a bill.4 The newer
statutes attempt to discourage conflicts of interest by requiring disclosure of a wide variety of financial information, usually on a
yearly basis. 6 They vary widely in the types of persons of whom they
1. Rogers, Conflicts of Interest-A Trap for Unwary Politicians, II OscooDE HALL

L.J. 537, 537 (1973).

2. E.g., Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 8, I Stat. 67 (forbidding the Secretary of the
Treasury from participating in the public securities market).
3. Three states apparently do not have any conflict of interest statutes: Montana
(although such statutes are authorized by the state constitution, MoNT. CONST. art,
13, § 4). Rhode Island, and South Carolina.
4. Some of these statutes apply generally to all state officials. E.g., FLA. STAT, ANN.
§§ 112.311-.319 (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 89-925 (1968); IDAHO CoDJ~ § 59-201
(1948); KY. REv. STAT• .ANN. §§ 61:092, :094 (1970), 61:096 (Supp. 1974); LA. REv. STAT,
.ANN. § 14.140 (1974): Mn• .ANN. CODE art. 19A, § 1-10 (1973); MICH. COl'IIP. LAws ANN.
§§ 15.301-.348 (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.87-.92 (1967); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 105.450-.495 (1966); NEV. REv. STAT, § 218.580 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT, ANN, §§ 95:l•:2
(1967); N.J. STAT, ANN. §§ 52:13A-12 to -27 (Supp. 1974); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 11-09-4'7
(Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, §§ 1401-16 (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN, §§ 2,1352 (Supp. 1974), 2.1-347 to -351, -353 to -358 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 42-18
(Supp. 1972); WYO. STAT, ANN. § 6-178 (Supp. 1973). Two states have similar provisions
in their constitutions. NEB. CONST. art. 3, § 16; S.D. CONST. art. 3, § 12,
Other states having the older type of conflict of interest statute have numerous
statutes directed at specific officials. E.g., ALAs. STAT, § 24.20.291 (19'71) (Legislative
Auditor); CoLO. REV. STAT• .ANN.§ 14-2-13 (1963) (employees of llanking Commission);
DEL. CODE .ANN. tit. 31, § 2821 (Supp. 1970) (officials of State lloard of Health); IoWA
CODE Arm. § 421.3 (1967) (Director of Internal Revenue); Miss. CoDE ANN. § '7'7-1-11
(1972) (Public Service Commission); N.C. GEN. STAT, § 14-234 (1969) (Director of Public Trust); ORE. REv. STAT. § 332.275 (1967) (directors and employees of school districts);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 505 (1971) (officers and employees of Department of llanking
and Insurance).
5. ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 327(19) (Supp. 1973); Aruz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-501 to -581
(Supp. 1973); CAL. GoVT. CoDE §§ 3700-04 (West 1973) (declared unconstitutional in
City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. I (1970));
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-76 (Supp. 1974): HAWAII REV. STAT. ch. 84 (Supp. 1973);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 604A-101 to -102 (1973); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 4-2-6-1 to -10
(Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-4301 to -06 (Supp. 1974); ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 3,
§§ 371-S5 (Supp. 1973): N.M. STAT• .ANN. §§ 5-12-1 to -15 (1974); N.Y. Pun. OFFICERS
LAW § 3(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. § 6252-9(b) (Supp. 1974);
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require disclosure: candidates,6 elected and appointed public officials,
public employees,7 and even related parties such as spouses, children,
and business associates may be included.8
The financial disclosure statutes have generated considerable controversy and litigation in some states,9 born out of the conflict beUTAH CODE ANN. § 67-16-17 (Supp. 1973); WASH. REV. CODE ch. 42.18 (1974); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 6B-l-l (Supp. 1974); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ ll.03-.10 (Supp. 1973).
6. Financial disclosure laws are distinct from campaign disclosure laws, which require pre-election reports of significant receipts or expenditures by or on behalf of
candidates and which may require the reporting of names and addresses of contributors of significant amounts. Unlike financial disclosure laws, campaign disclosure laws
do not require disclosure of a candidate's personal finances nor of income or gifts not
intended as campaign contributions. For examples of campaign disclosure laws, see
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-54 (Supp. II, 1972); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 99.161 (1960); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 168.906 (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 155.06 (Supp. 1973). See generally H. PENNIMCAN & R. WINTER, CAMPAIGN FINANCES:
Two VtEWS OF THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS (1971); Roady, Ten
Years of Florida's "Who Gave It-Who Got It" Law, 27 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 434
(1972); Note, Campaign Finance Reform: Pollution Control for the Smoke-Filled Rooms?,
23 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 631 (1972); Note, The Constitutionality of Financial Disclosure
Laws, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 345 (1974).
7. Public employees are distinguished from appointed public officials primarily by
the rank of the person conferring the job. Appointments are made at the state level
by the governor or a state commission and at the local level by a mayor. Legislative
approval may be necessary and the term of office may be fixed or left to the appointing
official's discretion. E.g., M1cH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 299.1 (1967)· (governor appoints
members of state commission on conservation, subject to confirmation by state senate,
for terms of six years; commissioners appoint director of conservation, who serves at
pleasure of commission); N.Y. EXEc. LAw § 180 (McKinney 1972) (director of Division
of Budget appointed by governor without legislative ratification to serve at governor's
pleasure). Public emplo)ees are hired by the head of a department or agency (or by a
low-ranking official to whom hiring authority has been delegated) and may serve at the
pleasure of the hiring official, e.g., MtcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.4 (1967) (civilian employees of state police), or may be protected by a state civil service system. E.g., MICH.
CoNsr. art. ll, § 6 (empowering state to create a civil service); M1CH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§§ 16.300-.304 (1967) (creating civil service system).
8. Compare !LL. REv. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 604A-101 to -102 (1973) (applying to certain
candidates, elected and appointed officials, public employees, and interests "constructively controlled" by the person required to file), with IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-2-6-8 (Supp.
1974) (applying to certain elected and appointed positions and to spouses and unemancipated children of those office holders only), and WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.240
(1974) (not applying to public employees). For a comparison of the coverage by several
state statutes of related parties, see note 151 infra.
9. The supreme courts of three states have considered challenges to the constitutionality of their state financial disclosure statutes. See City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young,
2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. l (1970); Stein v. Howlett, 52 lll. 2d 570,_ 289
N.E.2d 409 (1972), appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 925 (1973); Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d
275, 517 P.2d 911, !lppeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 417 U.S.
902 (1974). The California court struck down the state's statute, while the lllinois and
Washington courts upheld their statutes. A fourth statute was declared unconstitutional by a state attorney general. TEX. ATTY. GEN. OP. M-1039 (1972). In addition, the
new Alabama statute has generated at least six injunctions and threats of resignation
by public officials. N.Y. Times, July 22, 1974, at 10, col. 3 (late city ed.). Public officials
in California have also threatened to resign because of that state's financial disclosure
law. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 262-63, 466 P.2d 225, 227, 85
Cal. Rptr. I, 3 (1!170).
Despite the Supreme Court's dismissals of the appeals in the Illinois and Washing-
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tween the societal interests advanced by the disclosure statutes and
the individual interests infringed upon by them. By requiring disclosure, although in a noncriminal context, the newer conflict of
interest legislation invades individual privacy and therefore may induce individuals not to seek public office. On the other hand, there
clearly is a need for some kind of conflict of interest legislation.
Recent scandals at national10 and state11 levels confirm the existence
ton cases, the issue of the constitutionality of the disclosure statutes probably has not
been resolved. Summary dismissal for want of a federal question is of ambiguous import,
where, as in Stein and Fritz, the appeal is based on the claim that the state statute infringes on fundamental rights. The claim may fail to state a substantial federal question because there is no fundamental right or because a compelling state interest
clearly outweighs the individual right. See text at notes 15-18 infra. Summary dismissal
is similarly ambiguous.
In addition, the precedential value of dismissals generally is unclear, Some authorities treat dismissals for want of a substantial federal question as decisions on the merits.
E.g., Port Authority Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Port of New York Authority,
887 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Epton v, Nenna, 818 F. Supp. 899
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYS•
TEM 648-49 (2d ed. 1973); Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive J'irtues"-A Com•
ment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 1, 10·18
(1964); Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 89 n.18
(1959). Other commentators-without denying that such dismissals are in theory judg•
ments on the merits-find dismisssals of appeal closer to denials of certiorari because
dismissals often occur for want of a convenient, timely, or suitable question. A. BICKEL,
The Least Dangerous Branch 126-27 (1962); Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy and the
Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV,
169, 198-206, 218-49 (1968).
The Supreme Court has found substantial federal questions and heard full arguments on issues that were considered insubstantial only a few years earlier. For example,
Sunday closing laws were first found to present insubstantial federal questions, see
Kidd v. Ohio, 358 U.S. 182 (1958), but subsequently became substantial. See Ullner
v. Ohio, 358 U.S. 131 (1958); Grochowiak v. Pennsylvania, 358 U.S. 47 (1958); Gundaker
Cent. Motors, Inc. v. Gassert, 854 U.S. 938 (1957); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super
Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v.
McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
It has also been held that a summary affirmance without opinion does not preclude
a later court from adjudicating a similar issue. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 615-16,
487 P-2d 1241, 1263-64, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 623-24 (1971). But cf• .Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974), involving a citizen suit against the State of Illinois for retroactive
benefits under a federal-state aid program for the aged, blind, and disabled. The state
defended on the grounds that such a suit was in violation of the eleventh amendment.
The Supreme Court, in overruling the district court's verdict for the plaintiff, stated:
Three fairly recent District Court judgments requiring state directors of public
aid to make the type of retroactive J?a}ment involved here have been summarily
affirmed by this Court notwithstandmg Eleventh Amendment contentions made
by state officers ••••
• • • [T]hese three summary affirmances obviously are of prccedential value in
support of the contention that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the relief
awarded by the District Court in this case. Equally obviously, they are not of
the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the
question on the merits.
IO. For example, former Supreme Court Justice Abraham Fortas resigned in 1969
after it was disclosed that he had considered accepting a $20,000 annual retainer from
the Wolfson Foundation. U.S. NEWS &: WORLD REP., May 26, 1971, at 31; NATIONAL REVIEW, June 3, 1969, at 523. Former Vice-President Agnew was accused of taking construction contract kickbacks. N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1974, at I, col. 8 (late city ed.).
11. For example, former Lieutenant Governor Reinecke of California was con•
victed on a perjury charge. NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5, 1974, at 26,
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of widespread abuses of political position for personal gain. Such
incidents have contributed to the general decline in public confidence in government12 and have resulted in increased public concern.13 At least one state conflict of interest statute is a direct
response to a state scandal.14 The disclosure statutes may be effective in preventing potential conflicts of interest, informing the
public of the financial ties of elected and appointed officials and of
persons seeking such offices, and increasing public confidence in
government. Whether these state interests are sufficient to justify
the consequent infringement of individual liberties, however, depends on the constitutional stature of those liberties. If the individual interests are fundamental rights,15 the strict scrutiny test
applies, requiring that the state infringement be supported by a
"compelling governmental interest."16 Furthermore, the statute
must be narrowly drawn,17 so that there is no less onerous means
of achieving the state purpose.18 If the individual interests are not
fundamental rights, the statutes need only satisfy the minimal scrutiny test, which requires that legislation be rationally related to
legitimate state purposes. 19
This note will examine the individual interests in running for
office and in personal financial privacy in_ order to determine what
level of scrutiny should be applied to disclosure statutes. After concluding that only minimal scrutiny should apply-a standard certainly met by the state's strong interests-it will be argued that
nonconstitutional considerations bearing on the practicality of disclosure statutes nevertheless require a careful balancing of the state
12. A nationwide survey reported "growing disenchantment with government at all
levels-federal, state, and local." U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 6, 1974, at 6, 19. See
also TIME, May 20, 1974, at 18.
13. NEWSWEEK, Nov. 18, 1974, 'at 24, 25.
14. Act of April 24, 1957, ch. 100, [1957] Tex. Act 213 (declared unconstitutional in
TEX ATIY. GEN. OP. M-1039 (1972); replacement statute codified at TEX. REv. Civ.
STAT. § 6252-96 (Supp. 1974)), was passed after a stock fraud scandal involving the
Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives became public. Comment, Texas Public
Ethics Legislation: A Proposed Statute, 50 TEXAS L. REv. 931 (1972). See also Fritz v.
Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 289-94, 517 P.2d 911, 917-18, appeal dismissed for want of
substantial federal question, 417 U.S. 902 (1974).
15. E.g., personal privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); the right to vote, Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); trial by jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); freedom of speech,
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 38/> U.S. 589 (1967); freedom of association, Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
16. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
17. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 351-52, 357-58 (1972).
18. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
488 (1960).
'
19. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61 (1911). Furthermore, where fundamental rights are not involved a statute
will be held to have a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose "if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426
(1961).
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interest in disclosure against the individual interests of each class
of persons affected by the statutes. The discussion of the strength
of the state's interest in disclosure with respect to each class will
suggest legislative guidelines that achieve a practical balancing of
state and individual interests.
At the outset, it should be noted that the fifth amendment right
of an individual not to be compelled to testify against himself does
not invalidate financial disclosure requirements, even if the privilege
against self-incrimination could be invoked by an official whose
disclosures would show that he has been engaged in a conflict of interest or other illegal activity. 20 Moreover, it is arguable that the
disclosures required by conflict of interest laws are within the exception to the fifth amendment privilege-known as the "required
records" doctrine-for disclosures required to be made to the government for the enforcement of noncriminal regulatory statutes.21 The
Supreme Court has been willing to apply the doctrine to enable the
government to satisfy its need for information except where disclosure is sought from a "highly selective group inherently suspect
of criminal activities."22 The area of official conduct is not one "permeated with criminal statutes,"23 and thus may be distinguished from
the areas involved in cases refusing to apply the doctrine. 24 Even if
the required records doctrine is not applicable, the fifth amendment
objections can be eliminated by the grant of use immunity for the
information disclosed.25 The use immunity would prevent utilization
of the disclosures in prosecutions under the conflict of interest laws,
but would not hinder the disclosure laws' principal purpose of informing the public and deterring public office holders from becoming
enmeshed in potentially conflicting financial ties.
20. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927) (upholding conviction for willful
failure to file inoome tax return despite claim that some information required by tax
return was potentially incriminating; defendant should have filed and asserted fifth
amendment privilege as to specific items of disclosure). See generally Note, 59 CoRNELL
L. REv. 345, supra note 6, at 370·72.
21. See, e.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971): Haynes v. United States, 390
U.S. 85 (1967): Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1967): Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39 (1967); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. I (1948); McKay, Self-incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 SUP. Cr. REv. 193, 214-24; Note, Required Information
and the Privilege Against Self-incrimination, 65 CoLUllf. L. REv. 681 (1965).
22. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965). Accord,
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
23. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965). Accord,
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
24. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (Marijuana Tax Act): Haynes v.
United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (National Firearms Act): Grosso v. United States, 390
U.S. 62 (1968) (Gambling Tax Act): Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968)
(same): Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965) (statutory
requirement that Communist Party members register with Attorney General).
25. See K.astigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972): Counselman v, Hitchcock,
I42_D.S, 547 (1892).

March 1975]

Notes

763

Returning to the question of the appropriate standard of con•
stitutional review for financial disclosure laws, the first issue to be
faced is the status of the right to run for public office. If that right
is fundamental, it could be argued that strict scrutiny must be ap•
plied to the disclosure statutes, at least to the extent that they apply
to candidates for public office, elected officials, and political parties,
because the burden of disclosure has a chilling effect26 on the exer•
cise of the right. Although several recent cases dealing with state
restrictions on the ability of an individual to run for office clearly
have applied a more stringent standard than minimal security, they
have failed to label the right fundamental.
Bullock v. Carter21 and Lubin v. Panish 28 involved statutes that
required candidates to pay substantial filing fees in order to be
placed on the primary election ballot.29 The statutes in Storer v.
Brown80 and American Party v. White 31 required,certain candidates
to present nominating petitions with a stated number of signatures
in order to appear on the ballot.32 The Supreme Court struck down
the filing fee requirements in Lubin and Bullock but upheld the
petition requirements in American Party. In Storer, the Court ac•
cepted the concept of a petition requirement but remanded for· a
determination whether the particular requirements involved in that
case were unduly onerous. The Storer Court also upheld a party
disaffiliation provision, which requir~d candidates to dissociate
themselves from political parties entitled to participate in a primary
a year in advance of the election in which the candidates desired
to run as independents.38
These cases might be read as applying an intermediate standard
26. Regulation for a legitimate state purpose is invalid if it unnecessarily chills the
exercise of protected rights. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960).
27. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
28. 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
29. Under the statute in Bullock, fees as high as $8,900 were assessed, and the plaintiffs faced assessments of $1,424.60, $6,300, and $1,000, respectively. 405 U.S. at 135-36.
The statutes in Lubin required fees as high as $982 of candidates for governor and a
fee of $701.60 for the post sought by the plaintiff. 415 U.S. at 710.
30. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
31. 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
32. The statute in American Party requires parties receiving less than 200,000 votes
cast for governor in the last general election but more than two per cent of the vote
to nominate their candidates by convention. Those groups not qualified for primary
or convention procedure could nominate by petitions with the signatures of at least
one per cent of the vote in the last preceding gubernatorial election. 415 U.S. at 772-74.
The statute in Storer required the independent candidate to file nomination papers
signed by no less than five per cent nor more than six per cent of the entire vote cast
in the preceding general election in the area for which the candidate sought to run.
The signatures had to be obtained in a 24-day period following the primary from persons who did not vote in the primary election. 415 U.S. at 726-27.
33. 415 U.S. at 726.
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of judicial scrutiny.34 First, the Court did not consistently use traditional strict scrutiny language.85 For example, instead of using the
traditional test that the state may not use a given means of advancing its interest when "the end can be more narrowly achieved,"36
the Court in Lubin said only that the legislative means must not
"unfairly or unnecessarily burden"87 the individual right, and in
Bullock stated that the filing fee law must be found "reasonably
necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate state objectives."38
Second, Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Lubin39 and Justice
Brennan's dissenting opinion in Storer4° indicated a concern that the
majority in each of those cases was not applying strict scrutiny. Justice Douglas opined that Lubin was a traditional equal protection
case in which the filing fee requirement limited an indigent person's
exercise of a fundamental right. 41 That Justice Douglas felt the need
to ·write an opinion explicitly finding a fundamental right may indicate that the Court did not use strict scrutiny. However, the
opinion may have been written solely for emphasis. Justice Brennan's dissent in Storer more clearly evidences his belief that the
Court failed to apply the traditional strict scrutiny standard, at least
to the extent that the state did not prove and was not required to
prove that there was no less restrictive way that it could have accom•
plished its ends.42 The Court did not completely ignore the least
restrictive alternative test, b~t it effectively rendered the test inoperative for the purpose of upholding the disaffiliation provision by
shifting the burden of proof on the issue from the state, where it
traditionally lies,43 to the challenging parties.44 However, the remand on the issue of the petition requirements did appear to call
for the traditional least restrictive alternative test.45
There is some language in these cases indicating that strict
34. Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 {1973); San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) {Marshall, J., dissenting): Reed v, Recd,
404 U.S. 71 (1971). An intermediate standard might be appropriate here because of the
indirect effect on fundamental rights. See text at notes 53-59 infra,
35. See text at notes 15-18 supra.
36. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
37. 415 U.S. at 716.
38. 405 U.S. at 144.
39. 415 U.S. at 719.
40. 415 U.S. at 755.
41. 415 U.S. at 721-22 (Douglas, J., concurring).
42. 415 U.S. at 760-61 {Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally Wormuth &: Mirkin,
The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternatives, 9 UTAH L. REv. 254 {1964).
43. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 {1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 {1963).
44. Compare Storer, 415 U.S. at 736, with Storer, 415 U.S. at 760 {Brennan, J., dis•
senting).
45. See 415 U.S. at 740-46.
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scrutiny was applied. In Storer, the Court described the individual's
interest as being outweighed by a "compelling" state interest in the
stability of the political system,46 while in Bullock the Court stated
that the Texas statute was to receive "close scrutiny"47 according to
the standard announced in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,48
which applied strict scrutiny in an equal protection context to strike
down a poll tax as an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote.
In Lubin, the Court termed the state interest in discouraging
frivolous candidacies, which underlay the filing fee requirement, "of
the highest order."49 In American Party, the Court found the limitations on access to the ballot to be "valid measures, reasonably taken
in pursuit of vital state objectives that cannot be served equally well
in significantly less burdensome ways." 50 Thus, at least in American
Party, the Court applied a strict scrutiny standard explicitly including the least restrictive alternative requirement. 51 The four cases are
consistent with strict scrutiny, although Storer indicates that the
Court may not always rigorously apply the least restrictive alternative test.
If the cases involved strict scrutiny, however, it probably was not
because of the Court's concern over the right to run for office, although some language in the opinions seems to focus on that right. 52
Rather, in Bullock the Court explicitly based its holding on the right
to vote53-clearly a fundamental right54-noting that the right to
run for public office has never been recognized as an independent
fundamental right. 55 Limitations on access to the ballot affect the
right to vote because "the voters can assert their preferences only
through candidates or parties or both . . . ." 56 The two rights are
intertwined,57 but, except in American Party, the Court insisted on
analyzing the impact of the challenged statutes on the right to vote.58
46. 415 U.S. at 736.
47. 405 U.S. at 142.
48. 383 U.S. 663 (1963).
49. 415 U.S. at 715.
50. 415 U.S. at 781.
51. Storer, 415 U.S. at 760-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. For example, in Lubin the Court stated that "[t]he right of a party or an individual to a place on the ballot is entitled to protection ••• ," 415 U.S. at 716, and
in American Party the Court said that "[t]he Constitution requires that access to the
electorate be real, not 'merely theoretical.'" 415 U.S. at 783, quoting Jenness v. Fortson,
403 U.S. 431, 439 (1971).
53. 405 U.S. at 144.
54. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
55. 405 U.S. at 142-43.
56. Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716.
57. Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716; Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143.
58. See Storer, 415 U.S. at 729-30; Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716; Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144.
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According to this analysis, a challenge to a financial disclosure
statute would have to assert that the statute has a chilling effect
on the right to run for office and therefore directly and significantly
impairs voters' rights to vote for the candidate of their choice. Showing a burden on certain individuals' ability to run for public office
probably would not be sufficient; to be successful, the argument
would have to show that the burden fell on potential candidates in
such a way as to exclude candidates representing certain views,
thereby depriving some voters of the ability to "assert their preferences."59 A comparison of financial disclosure statutes with the
statutes struck down in Bullock and Lubin and the statutes upheld
in Storer and American Party suggests that such an argument would
not be persuasive.
First, it is hard to see how disclosure statutes narrow the range
of views represented on the ballot. The filing fee requirements in
Bullock and Lubin discriminated against the indigent, a "traditionally disfavored" classification,60 and the Court apparently was willing
to assume that wealthier candidates might not adequately represent
the views of poor people. Like the petition statutes upheld in Storer
and American Party, financial disclosure laws do not appear to involve a traditionally discriminatory classification. Disclosure of financial ties may in fact be a greater burden for the rich, who presumably
have more ties to disclose, than they are for the poor.
Second, a reasonably dra·wn disclosure statute does not impose
requirements that would be impossible for some candidates to meet,
whereas the filing fee requirements in Bullock and Lubin posed absolute barriers to candidates who could not afford to pay the fees. 01
Similarly, disclosure statutes are in this respect less of a restriction
on the right to run for public office than the petition requirements
upheld in Storer62 and American Party, which barred the candidacy
of persons without serious support. Compliance with disclosure
statutes might be impossible where the candidate or officeholder is
required to disclose the financial affairs of his relatives or business
associates and such related parties refuse to give him the information,63 but a well-drafted statute could avoid this problem by provid59. Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716.
60. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
61. Lubin, 415 U.S. at 717-18; Bullock, 405 U.S. at 137, 146.
62. The remand in Storer was for the purpose of deciding whether the details of
the petition requirements foreclosed ballot access to serious, minority party candidates.
See text following note 32 supra.
63. Cf. Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 286, 517 P.2d 911, 918-19, appeal dismissed
for want of substantial federal question, 417 U.S. 902 (1974). The Washington statute
requires each officeholder and candidate to file a financial statement for "himself and his
immediate family." WASH. REv. CoDE § 42.17.240(1) (1974). The Washington Supreme
CQurt's suggestion that the candidate resolve such a situation by terminating the relationship is not very practical, especially with regard to minor children.
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ing fo! waiver of the disclosure requirement to the extent the
candidate or official shows that his good-faith efforts to get the required information were unavailing.64
Finally, the state's interest in preventing the election of candidates prone to conflicts of interest, which underlies the disclosure
statutes, seems similar to the compelling interest in preventing
ballot flooding by candidates without substantial support, which
underlay the petition requirements upheld in Storer and American
Party. Both interests concern the stability of the political system.
Thus, even if. the right to run for public office is fundamental, and
even if the right to vote is somehow involved, the state's interest in
disclosure statutes probably is strong enough to justify the resultant
infringement on these rights.
Moreover, financial disclosure laws are better suited to accomplishing their underlying purposes than the statutes struck down in
Bullock and Lubin. The substantial filing fee requirements involved
in Bullock and Lubin were poor methods of weeding out spurious
candidates because ability to pay a fee is not a very good test of the
seriousness of a candidacy. As the Court pointed out in Lubin, any
wealthy merchant could pay the filing fee and run for office for the
sole purpose of advertising, while serious but indigent candidates
were excluded.65 In contrast, disclosure statutes enable the public
to know about the financial ties of public officials and candidates or
nominees for public office. The electorate then can vote for candidates who are not likely to be involved in conflicts of interest, try to
influence the appointment of trustworthy nominees, and bring
prosecutions against, or urge the public prosecutor to charge, officials
who do act in conflict of interest. The disclosure required by such
statutes contributes to the prevention of conflicts of interest by inducing officials and candidates to divest themselves of potentially
embarrassing financial ties. 66 The preventive and remedial aspects of
the laws contribute to increasing public confidence in government.
64. Similarly, a waiver provision would be needed if disclosure requirements were
so detailed that they conflicted with the ethical injunctions of confidentiality in
privileged relationships. Cf. WASH. REV. CoDE § 42.17.240(1)(£)-(g) (1974) (requiring
disclosure of the consideration given or services performed in exchange for compensation received from any business entity by a candidate or officeholder or by any business
entity in which such a person holds at least a IO per cent interest). For example, even
a general statement that legal services were performed for a particular client might
violate the lawyer-client privilege "[i]f the identification of the client conveys information which ordinarily would be conceded to be part of the usual privileged communication between attorney and client ••••" Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 632 (9th Cir.
1960).
65. 415 U.S. at 717.
66. During his confirmation hearin~, Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller offered to
put all of his securities into blind trusts and to ask the trustees of two trusts of which
he is a beneficiary to treat him as if the trusts were blind. U.S. NEWS &: WolU.D REP.,
Oct. 7, 1974, at 32.
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Thus, while there may be arguments about the proper scope of
disclosure statutes,67 the concept of requiring disclosure of the
financial affairs of public officials and candidates is probably a sufficiently narrow and effective means of achieving the state's interests
to qualify as the least restrictive infringement on the rights to vote
and to run for public office.
The other argument for subjecting the financial disclosure statutes to strict scrutiny is based on the right of privacy. This right,
unlike the right to run for office, could be asserted by all persons
affected by the statutes: candidates, officeholders, ap.d public employees and their spouses, children, other relatives, and associates.
While the Court has not passed on whether there is a right to personal financial privacy, its decisions regarding other aspects of the
right of privacy do lend some support to an argument that the right
extends to personal finances.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 68 the Supreme Court relied on the
right of privacy to strike down a Connecticut statute forbidding the
use of contraceptives. Without delimiting the scope of the zone of
privacy, the opinion of the Court found that the marital relationship lay ·within that zone.69 Three concurring justices identified "the
rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family" 70 as being
within the protected zone, although they noted that "the Court's
holding ... in no way interferes with a state's proper regulation of
sexual promiscuity and misconduct." 71
In Roe v. Wade, 12 the Court struck down a state statute substantially restricting a woman's ability to obtain a nontherapeutic
abortion as an overbroad infringement on the woman's fundamental
right of privacy. 73 Because the plaintiff was unmarried,74 the Court's
decision extended the right of privacy beyond the marital relationship. Roe did not dramatically extend the Griswold holding, however,
because a woman's ability to have an abortion may bear on her decision to have sexual relations. Several other Supreme Court cases have
recognized the right of privacy in the area of sexual relations and
decisions regarding the bearing of children.76 The Court has strayed
67. See text at notes 138-53 infra.
68. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
69. 381 U.S. at 485. A concurring opinion stated that "[t]he Connecticut statutes
••• dealt with a particularly important and sensitive area of privacy ••••" 381 U.S. at
495 (Goldberg, J.).
70. 381 U.S. at 495.
71. 381 U.S. at 499.
72. 410 U.S. ll3 (1973).
73. 410 U.S. at 164. The decision spawned a proposal to amend the Constitution to
restrict abortions. NEW Rfil'UBLIC, May 18, 1974, at 5.
74. 410 U.S. at 120.
75. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (striking down mandatory maternity leave rules for pregnant teachers in public schools because the right
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somewhat from this area by extending the right of privacy to protect
possession of obscene material in the home.76 It has been suggested
that the right of privacy may extend to private homosexual or extramarital heterosexual behavior;77 nontraditional family relationships ;78
the use of marijuana in one's home; 79 hair length; 80 some types of information sought by police, governmental officials, and social welfare
agencies; 81 and loyalty oaths, freedom to travel, religious freedom,
and other related first amendment rights.82
While the zone of privacy recognized by the Supreme Court to
date does not appear at first blush to extend to personal financial
affairs, the California Supreme Court made such an extension in
City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young. 83 The court there held that the
financial disclosure portion of the California conflict of interest statute impermissibly infringed on the personal privacy right. 84 The statute required all elected officials and candidates for public office and
certain other public officials and public employees to file annual disof privacy protects "matters of marriage and family life," 414 U.S. at 639); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down statute prohibiting unmarried persons from
using contraceptives except to prevent spread of disease; holding based on equal protection).
76. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
77. Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct,
72 MICH. L. REv. 1613 (1974); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal
Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 670, 732-38 (1973).
78. Note, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 670, supra note 77, at 743-52.
79. Id. at 758-60.
80. Id. at 760.
81. Emerson, Nine Judges in Search of a Doctrine, 64 M1cH. L. R.Ev. 219, 233 (1965),
82. McKay, The Right of Privacy: Emanations and Intimations, 64 MICH. L. REv.
259, 279 (1965). But one commentator has stated that no case has extended the right
"[b]eyond the sphere of sexual intimacy, parenthood, child rearing, family and the
home." Note, The Constitutional Right of Privacy: An Examination, 69 Nw. U. L. REv.
263, 277 (1974).
83. 2 Cal. 3d 259, 268, 466 P.2d 225, 234-35, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7-8 (1970).
In upholding the Illinois financial disclosure law, the Illinois Supreme Court apparently found that the right of privacy guaranteed in the state constitution, !LI..
CONST. art. 1, § 6, extended to personal finances; however, it upheld the statute because
it found the state's interests compelling. Stein v. Howlett, 52 Ill. 2d 570, 578, 289
N.E.2d 409, 413 (1972), appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 925 (1973). In upholding the Washington statute, the Washington Supreme Court relied on Stein, Fritz v. Gorton, 83
Wash. 2d 275, -, 517 P.2d 911, 926, appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal
question, 417 U.S. 902 (1974), ignoring the fact that Stein was based on the Illinois
constitution. Moreover the Washington court apparently measured its statute by minimal rather than by strict scrutiny. It stated that "[r]espondents assert the [statute] does
not sufficiently relate required disclosures to the nature of the office. It would be, however, an insurmountable legislative task to tailor disclosures to each of literally a myriad
of public posts. • •• The all inclusive, generic terms of section 24 are not irrationally
unrelated to the legitimate purpose they are to achieve." 83 Wash. 2d at-, 517 P.2d
at 926 (emphasis added).
84. 2 Cal 3d at 262, 466 P .2d at 227, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 3. The court struck down
the whole statute because it found the financial disclosure provisions inseparable. 2 Cal.
8d at 272, 466 P .2d at 235, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
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closure statements "describing the nature and extent of [their]
investments, including the ownership of shares in any corporation ... or financial interest in any business entity, which is subject
to regulation by any state or local public agency, if such investment
is in excess of ten thousand dollars .•. at the time of the statement."811
The statements were made public records. 88 The California court
relied on the reasoning employed in Griswold to find the right of
privacy in the "penumbras" of several articles of the Bill of Rights,
but its analysis rested on the assertion that "the right of privacy
concerns ... one's own peace of mind ... ," an idea it derived
from a common-law invasion of privacy case.87 It found personal
financial affairs to be within the zone of privacy because privacy in
these matters is essential to peace of mind.88 The court also was concerned that publication of an individual's assets might bring about
invasions of privacy in the form of unwanted solicitation by salesmen, lawsuits filed for the purpose of harassing the individual into
settlement, and general exposure to criminals.80 In addition, the
court relied on People v. Edwards,90 its own decision interpreting
the fourth amendment to prohibit the search of outside trashcans
that are "adjunct[s] to the domestic economy." 01 Personal financial
affairs seemed to the court to be "clearly more than the 'adjunct to
the domestic economy,' " because they constitute the "primary supporting pillar of that economy." 92
The California court's analysis in City of Carmel-by-the-Sea
seems weak,93 and fails to show how extending privacy to personal
85. CAL. Gov. CODE § 3700 (West Supp. 1973).
86. CAL. Gov. CoDE § 3700 (West Supp. 1973).
87. 2 Cal. 3d at 268, 466 P.2d at 231, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
88. 2 Cal. 3d at 268, 466 P.2d at 231-32, 85 Cal, Rptr. at 7-8,
89. 2 Cal. 3d at 270, 466 P.2d at 233, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 9•
. 90. 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
91. 71 Cal. 2d at 1104, 458 P.2d at 718, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
92. 2 Cal. 3d at 268,466 P.2d at 231, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
The majority also cited a number of federal and state decisions supporting the as•
sertions that "[t]he concept of personal liberties and fundamental human rights en•
titled to protection against overbroad intrusion or regulation by government ••• extends
to basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' ••• ," 2 Cal, 3d at 266, 466
P.2d at 230, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 6, quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 307 U.S. 319, 325, (1937),
and that many of the forms of association that have been protected are social, legal,
and economic in nature. 2 Cal. 3d at 231,466 P.2d at 267, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 7. Judge Mosk
countered in dissent that "[t]he majority cites a plethora of cases involving the basic
values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' ••• but with a few exceptions the
cited authorities involve assaults upon First Amendment rights •••• Precisely which
provision of the First Amendment does this statute offend? The majority have given no
clue." 2 Cal. 3d at 278, 466 P .2d at 239, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
93. For criticism of City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, see Note, A Constitutional Right o/
Privacy Protects Personal Financial Affairs of Public Officials from Overbroad Disclosure
Requirements, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 346 (1971); Comment, Financial Disclosure by Public
Officials and Public Employees in Light of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 18 UCLA L,
REv. 534 (1971); 45 TULANE L. R.Ev, 167 (1970).
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financial affairs is consistent with the limited scope of the right
recognized in Griswold.84 First, reliance on the common law of invasion of privacy is misplaced in a constitutional argument. Second,
it has been suggested that the danger of other invasions of privacy
due to public disclosure is exaggerated.95 Third, the court's explanation of its reliance on Edwards rests on its questionable equation of
two different meanings of the term "domestic economy," the first
being a description of the physical activities characteristic of a
home and the second a term for the financial affairs of the home.96
The court does not othenvise explain how the fourth amendment
restriction on physical invasions of the home by the police supports
the argument that the government cannot require an individual
to divulge information about financial activities, many of which
take place outside the home.
The argument in favor of extending the right of privacy probably can be stated more persuasively. For example, one may argue
that the fourth amendment is relevant because financial disclosure
laws are a method of gathering information that the state could not
send police into the home to seize without probable cause. The
weakness of this argument lies in the fact that much financial information could be gathered from sources outside the home, such as
employers, banks, and stock exchanges or corporate share registers.
Furthermore, the fourth amendment right is subject to "reasonable"
infringements by the government, a limitation that has been interpreted so broadly in the noncriminal context as to limit the right
for practical purposes to a protection against physical invasions of an
individual's household by agents of the state.97
One may also argue along the lines of Roe v. Wade that personal
financial privacy is a fundamental right98 because it is a "principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental." 99 A comparison of the treatment of
personal financial affairs with the treatment of sexual, marital, and
family affairs, which have already been recognized as lying within
94. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), had not yet been decided.
95. 45 TULANE L. REv. 167, 171 (1970).
96. Compare the definition of "economy" as "the system of arrangement or mode of
operation or functioning of anything," WEBSI'ER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 ("economy" 3a), with its definition as "the management of a person's
household or private affairs." Id. at 720 ("economy" Id.).
97. See United States v. Rickenbacker, 309 F.2d 462, 463 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 962 (1963) (upholding census questionnaire), cited with approval in Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309, 321 (1971).
98. 410 U.S. at 153. The several concurring opinions in Griswold had been unable to
agree upon the constitutional source of the right. See Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries,
Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH.
L. REv. 235, 236-40. (1965).
99. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
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the zone of privacy, may bolster the argument. Both types of activities are basic to American society: The individual and his or her
family are the basic social and economic units of society. The reasons
for protecting the privacy of personal financial affairs are similar to
some of the policies underlying the right of sexual, marital, and family privacy. In both cases people instinctively feel that these areas
are private.1°0 Also, a certain measure of privacy seems necessary to
foster the social and economic functions of these units. The prying
eyes of government officials and neighbors might discourage marriage
and the bearing and rearing of children. Similarly, individual financial enterprise may be discouraged or competitively disadvantaged
by exposure to public scorn, envy, or curiosity.
Recognition of privacy as a common-law right also shows the
great value American society places on it.101 Many writers have found
deep philosophical and sociological underpinnings to the right of
privacy,102 and the right has been held to protect a variety of personal
affairs from unwarranted publicity.103 In the area of personal finan100. Although the American public does not seem to be hesitant to respond to survey questions, questions about money and income encounter more resistance than
questions about other subjects. A. WESI'IN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOII! 53 (1st ed. 1967),
101. A common-law right of privacy was proposed in a law review article by Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890, in which they described it as "securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right 'to be let alone.'" Warren &: Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890) (footnote omitted), quoting T. CoOLE\',
TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888). The Warren and Brandeis article grew out of an actual incident involving "prying, gossipy accounts of the social activities of members of
Warren's family in a Boston newspaper that specialized in such revelations." Beany,
The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 253, 257 (1966).
The article proposed a new legal remedy for such problems: the tort of invasion of
privacy. Warren &: Brandeis, supra, at 219.
Later commentators have argued that the definition of privacy as the "right to be
let alone" is too negative. It has been suggested that the right of privacy is "an effort
to define some reasonable rules for governing the behavior of active people whose •••
interactions are part of a highly complex interdependent society[,] ••• an affirmation
of the importance of certain aspects of the individual person and his desired freedom
from unreasonable intrusive conduct by others," Beany, supra, at 254, or an effort to
define an individual's "control over when and by whom the (physical) parts of us (as
identifiable persons) can be seen or heard (in person or by the use of photographs, recordings, T.V., etc.), touched, smelled, or tasted by others," Parker, A Definition of
Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L, R.Ev. 275, 283-84 (1974), or an effort to define "the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others." A. 'W.ESTIN, supra note
100, at 7.
102. See, e.g., A. WESTIN, supra note 100; Beany, supra note 101; Bloustcin, Privacy
as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U, L. REv. 962
(1964); Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 34 (1967); Jourard, Some
Psychological Aspects of Privacy, 31 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 307 (1966); Konvitz, Privacy
and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude, 31 LAW &: CONTEMP. PROB, 272 (1966); Negley,
Philosophical Views on the Value of Privacy, 31 LAW &: CONTEMP. PRon. 319 (1966);
Parker, supra note 101, at 275; Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW
&: CoNTEMP. PROB. 281 (1966).
103. See, e.g., Steding v. Battistoni, 3 Conn. Cir. 76, 208 A.2d 559 (1964) (unauthorized
filing of suit in plaintiff's name); Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S,E,
194 (1930) (unauthorized publishing of pictures of newborn deformed child); Pavesich
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cial matters, it has been held to. prevent a creditor from harassing a
debtor by publicizing the fact of the debt.104
While the government has legitimate interests in restricting the
privacy of financial affairs, these restrictions do not necessarily contradict the proposition that the right of personal financial privacy
is of fundamental value to American society, because the state restricts marital privacy in similar ways. For example, the state licenses
marriages105 and many businesses.106 The tax laws require disclosure
of marital status and of income.107 Some state divorce statutes require disclosure of the details of the break.down of a divorcing
couple's marriage,1°8 just as the Bankruptcy Act requires disclosure
of the details of the break.down of a business filing for bankruptcy.109
Despite these arguments, the fact that American society is accustomed to extensive invasions of financial privacy suggests that financial privacy is not "rooted in American traditions." As the dissent
in City of Carmel-by-the-Sea points out, "compulsory disclosure for
purposes of licensing and regulation has been held to be constitutional in a wide variety of economic enterprises.''110 Social security111
and income taxes, for example, could not be collected without
compulsory disclosure of income to the government. The securities
laws require that some financial information concerning directors,
v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (unauthorized use of individual's name and face for advertising).
Damages for the tort of invasion of privacy-like damages for libel or slander per
se-are awarded without the need to prove special damages. Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 201-02, 50 S.E. 68, 73 (1905). See also W. PROSSER, LAw OF
TORTS§ 117 (4th ed. 1971). Recently, however, the Supreme Court restored the requirement that "actual damages" be proved in suits against the press by private persons in
cases in which "liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
104. Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962); Rugg
v. McCarty, 173 Colo. 170,476 P.2d 753 (1970); Trammel v. Citizen's News Co., 285 Ky.
529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927); Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1959); Liberty Loan
Corp. v, Brown, 493 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Tollefson v. Price, 247 Ore. 398,
430 P .2d 990 (1967).
105. See, e.g., N.Y. DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW § 13 (McKinney 1964).
106. See, e.g., CAL. Ptm. UTILlTIF.S CoDE §§ 5371-79 (West Supp. 1974) (charter passenger carriers); N.Y. Ptm. HEALTH LAw §§ 3000-08 (McKinney 1967) (ambulance services).
107. See, e.g., !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1.
108. See, e.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 13, § 1522 (1953); IDAHO CODE § 32-603 (Supp.
1974).
109. Bankruptcy Act § 7, 11 U.S.C. § 25 (1970) (applying to personal bankruptcy
petitions); Bankruptcy Act § 130, 11 U.S.C. § 530 (1970) (applying to corporate bankruptcy petitions).
110. 2 Cal. 3d at 281, 466 P.2d at 241, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 17 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
111. Under the regulations implementing the social security tax, employers must
disclose to the federal government the names, addresses, and remuneration paid to all
employees and the amounts withheld, 26 C.F.R. §§ 31.6001, .60ll (1974),
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officers, and major shareholders of corporations be made public.112
Furthermore, the common-law right of privacy is limited to the
truly private aspects of an individual's life, and is lost to the extent
that an individual becomes the subject of legitimate public attention.
For example, by becoming a candidate for public office a person's
life ceases to be private in those particulars that relate to his fitness
for public office.113 It has been held that the first amendment limits
the use of state and federal libel and invasion of privacy statutes to
inhibit the media's freedom to publish information about public
figures, 114 news,11 6 and other information of public interest.116
Finally, a consideration of the multifold consequences for many
other statutes that would result from the recognition of personal
financial privacy as a fundamental right argues strongly against such
a recognition. Extending the right of privacy in this manner would
require tax, social security, census, and licensing statutes, for instance, to undergo strict scrutiny, traditionally a very demanding
standard.117 Although there probably are compelling state interests
· underlying the central requirements of these statutes, a court applying the "least restrictive means" standard would be hard pressed to
uphold the statutes in their entirety.118 For example, the state probably has a compelling interest in acquiring some of the information
112. E.g., Securities Act of 1933, § IO(a)(I) and Schedule A(4), (14), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77j
(a)(l), 77aa(4), (14) (1970) (requiring disclosure of names, addresses, and remuneration of directors and officers to be made in the prospectus). A prospectus must accom•
pany offers to sell an issue of stock. Securities Act of 1933, § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)
(1970).
113. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 199-200, 50 S.E. 68, 72
(1905) (dictum) (speaks of this limitation as "waiver" of the right); Ellenberg v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 648, 188 S.E.2d 911 (1972); Wright, Defamation, Privacy, and
the Public's Right To Know: A National Problem and a New Approach, 46 TEXAS L.
R.Ev. 630, 637, 639-40, 642 (1968); Warren &: Brandeis, supra note 101, at 215-16,
For the importance of wide-open discussion on political qualifications and con•
duct, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-83 (1964).
114. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
115. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 347, 349 (1974) (overruling Rosenbloom but retaining some first amend•
ment limitations against the use of state libel laws). See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohen, 43 U.SL.W. 4343 (U.S. March 4, 1975).
116. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
117. Strict scrutiny almost always has led to invalidation of the challenged statute,
E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964). See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissent•
ing): "Some lines must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the 'compeling state in•
terest' standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law has ever
satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it
demands nothing less than perfection." But cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
118. The Court seemed unwilling to do so in Storer v. Brown. See text at notes
42-45 supra. But see text at notes 50-51 supra.
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that must be disclosed on census forms,119 such as the name, relationship, sex, race, age, and marital status of each member of every household.120 However, it is not clear that disclosure of all of the many
additional items of financial information required by the census
forms-such as the market value of each person's house,121 the nature
or his or her work,12 2 the amount eamed,123 the identity of his or
her employer,124 the amount of rent paid,125 the amount of each
home's average gas bill,126 or the number of cars owned by each
household127-is justified by a compelling state interest. Nor is it
clear that requiring disclosure of all persons, or even a randomly
chosen group of people, is the least restrictive means of obtaining
the necessary statistical data; solicitation of voluntary disclosure
might be sufficient.128 The state may have legitimate interests in
obtaining the additional information for social research and program planning,129 but recognition of financial privacy as a fundamental right would force courts to make an awkward choice of
striking down many of the census requirements or upholding them
by bending the strict scrutiny standard.
The argument raised in City of Carmel-by-the-Sea that disclosure
may lead to physical invasion of the home by importunate salesmen
or criminals alerted to the details of a person's financial status130
119. The Secretary of Commerce has virtually unlimited discretion to determine
the scope of the questions to be asked on census forms. 13 U.S.C. § 5 (1970). Failure
to answer or giving false answers is punishable by a fine and imprisonment. 5 U.S.C.
§ 221 (1970). It has been held that the census questionnaire is not an unreasonable
"search and seizure" because "[t]he authority to gather reliable statistical data reasonably related to government purposes and functions is a necessity if modem government
is to legislate intelligently and effectively•.•• The questions contained in the household questionnaire related to important federal concerns, such as housing, labor, and
health, and were not unduly broad or sweeping in their scope." United States v. Rickenbacker, 309 F.2d 462,463 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 962 (1963), cited with approval in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 321 (1971). See generally Fernandez, The Census,
42 S. CAL. L. REv. 245 (1969).
120. BUREAU OF CENsus, DEPT. OF Co:M:MERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HousJNG, INFORMATIONAL COPY OF SUBJECr CONTENT PLANNED FOR THE 1970 CENsus 2, cols.
1-8 (Form D60(XT) 1968) reprinted in Hearings on S. 1791 Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 834,
836 (1969).
121. Id. at 3, No. H12.
122. Id. at 6, No. 29a.
123. Id. at 7, No. 40.
124. Id. at 7, No. 33.
125. Id. at 3, No. Hl3.
126. Id. at 5, No. HI4(b).
127. Id. at 5, No. H23.
128. Dependence on voluntary disclosure might skew the statistical data, however,
because voluntary respondents might tend to come from a certain segment of the popu. lation. It might be possible to overcome this problem through follow-up interviews.
129. Cf. Fernandez, supra note 119.
130. See text at note 89 supra.
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must also be answered. As several commentators on that case have
pointed out, this danger seems exaggerated.131 Furthermore, such
invasions would not themselves be state action, especially in light
of the existence of legal remedies for trespass, robbery, and coercion.
A similar objection would be that the required disclosure might
relate to clearly protected areas of privacy. For instance, the laws
conceivably could mandate disclosure of debts for abortions or
vasectomies.132 This problem probably would arise infrequently,
however. Many disclosure statutes do not require the disclosure of
debts,133 and those that do usually do not cover personal debts because of substantial limitations on the size of the debts that must
be reported.134 In any case, a well-drafted statute could avoid the
problem by authorizing an independent body to allow nondisclosure
of such matters.135
The constitutional right of privacy has been thrust into prominence by the Griswold and Wade decisions. In light of the contemporary concern over governmental intrusion into personal affairs,130
it is appealing to extend privacy to shield the individual from the
new intrusions of financial disclosure laws. But uneasiness over such
intrusions should not necessarily imply that the disclosure laws infringe upon a fundamental right. The uneasiness may stem from the
novelty of the laws rather than from concern over the inviolability
of personal financial privacy. It is true that some requirements of
present disclosure laws may be unwise,137 but the Constitution merely
131. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
132. Although the privacy cases concern only government regulation of protected
activities, and not disclosure of information, disclosure that deters or "chills" the exercise of protected activities arguably would also be prohibited. Cf. Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957). See also note 26~upra.
133. E.g., !LI.. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-102 (1973).
134. E.g., WASH. R.Ev. CODE § 42.I7.240(l)(c) (1974) (requires disclosure of debts only
if over $500).
135. Cf. text at notes 63-64 supra.
136. For example, government misuse of computerized informatjon recently has at•
tracted much scholarly attention. See, e.g., Douglas, The Computerization of Government Files: What Impact on the Individual?-Foreword, 15 UCLA L. R.Ev. 1371, 1374
(1968); Grenier, Computers and Privacy: A Proposal for Self-Regulation, 1970 DUKE L.J.
495; MacDonald, Confidentiality and Security of Computerized Records, 24 JUVENILE
JusnCE 2 (1974); Meldman, Centralized Information Systems and the Legal Right to
Privacy, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 335 (1969); Miller, Computers, Data BanllS and Individual
Privacy: An Overview, 4 CoLtlM, HUMAN RIGHTS L REv. l (1972); Miller, Personal Pri•
vacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an InformationOriented Society, 67 MICH, L. R.Ev. 1089 (1969); Ruggles, Pemberton &: Miller,
Symposium: Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REV. 211
(1968); Whitear, Privacy and the Computer, 122 NEW L.J. 555 (1972); Project-Privacy
and Efficient Government: Proposals for a National Data Center, 82 HARV. L. REv. 400
(1968); Note, Computer Data Bank-Privacy Controversy Revisited: An Analysis and
an Administrative Proposal, 22 CATH, U. L. R.Ev. 628 (1973); Note, Protection of Privacy
of Computerized Records in the National Crime Information Center, 1 U. MICH. J. L.
REF. 594 (1974).
137. Cf. Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, - , -, 517 P .2d 911, 918-19, 926·27, appeal
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provides minimum standards for the exercise of governmental power.
It does not require wise laws. Although the fundamental right of
privacy should not be extended to personal financial affairs, the
arguments discussed above in favor of extending the right demonstrate that financial privacy does have some value in American society.138 By requiring disclosure, the new conflict of interest statutes
may so burden the acceptance of public office or public employment
that few qualified individuals will be willing to put themselves
forward for government positions. A legislature therefore would be
wise to tailor its disclosure statute as unobtrusively as possible, even
if not constitutionally required to do so. The common-law right
of privacy, a rough measure of society's concern for privacy, excepted
only matters that directly affected a candidate's fitness for office
or an official's performance or conduct in office.139 A disclosure
statute that reflects the common-law principle of a direct connection
between the disclosure required and the state interest served will be
less likely to deter qualified individuals from public service than a
broad-ranging statute. Thus, the test that should guide the legislature is much the same as the test that would apply if a fundamental
right were infringed: The level of disclosure required of each category of persons covered by the statute should be tailored to fit the
degree of the state's interest in disclosure.
Variations in the level of disclosure could be made (1) in the
number and type of items that must be disclosed, and (2) in the degree to which the disclosures are made available to the public. Variations of the first kind do not appear justifiable. I£ the state has any
legitimate interest in disclosure, that interest extends to disclosure
of all of a person's major financial ties.140 Variations in the degree
to which disclosure is made public, however, would mitigate the
invasions of privacy created by the disclosure requirements without
dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 417 U.S. 902 (1974); text at notes
138-63 infra.
138. See text at notes 99-104 supra.
139. See text following note 112 supra.
140. The principal items that should be disclosed are major assets and investments,
such as real estate and stock holdings, salaries, and other sources of income, gifts, and
debts. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-102 (1973) (requiring disclosure of professional income and other income if from a business doing business within state or
from a unit of government; capital assets including real estate but stock ownership
only if company does business within state; the identity of (but not amount of income
derived from) compensated lobbyists); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75--4301 to -4302 (Supp.
1974) (requiring disclosure of ownership of legal or equitable interest exceeding 5 per
cent or $5,000, whichever is less, in any business, and all gifts or income of any form
exceeding $1,000). It is questionable whether the state's interest extends to the reporting of exact dollar amounts. Reporting within $100 or $1000 categories may be sufficient.
Nor is it likely that the state has a very significant interest in items below a certain
dollar level.
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defeating the state interests involved. Such vanat1ons could be
achieved by allowing confidential disclosure to be made to an ethics
committee in some situations.141 The committee could serve as a
watchdog for the public interest, making public or forwarding to
the appropriate authorities any information disclosed to it that reveals conflicts of interest.142 The committee could also be charged
with hearing and investigating citizen complaints and bringing
charges when there is reasonable cause to believe that an official or
public employee has failed to make proper disclosure.143 In order to
carry out these functions, the committee should be independent
of all other governmental entities.144 This dual-level system would
allow some differentiation by which disclosure requirements could
be tailored to the state's widely varying interests in disclosure by
each group of public officials. There are three principal categories
of persons working for the state: elected officials, appointed officials,
and public employees.145
The state has some interest in disclosure by each of these groups,
as well as by candidates for elective office, nominees for public office,
141. Cf. Comment, supra note 14, at 993-94, proposing a model statute. The author
suggests that public disclosure be required of "state-level elected officers, officials ap•
pointed directly by the Governor, and all , •• state employees [paid over $11,000 per
year, and] elected and high-bracket officials of county and city governments of more
than 400,000 population." Id. at 938 (footnotes omitted). All other officials would be
required to make confidential disclosure at most. This plan thus would frustrate to
some extent the puzpose of the disclosure requirement by preventing the public from
having the benefit of financial disclosure by candidates for elective office in small and
medium-sized towns. The plan further deviates from the guidelines proposed hereinafter by requiring the same level of disclosure from the officeholder or public employee
as from parties related to or associated with him, see text at notes 152-53 infra, and by
employing an income cut-off for public employees. See text at note 150 infra.
Some states provide for confidential disclosure to an ethics committee or commission.
The disclosures remain confidential unless the committee finds that the official has
violated the conflict of interest statutes. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-75 (Supp. 1974);
HAWAII REv. STAT, § 84-18 (1972). The Wisconsin statute provides for confidentiality
in most cases even after charges are brought. WIS. STAT. ANN, § ll.08(IO)(a) (Supp. 1974).
142. The creation of such a committee would entail the disadvantages of additional
fiscal and bureaucratic burdens, However, the committee's function could be expanded
by giving it the power to grant waivers of disclosure requirements in cases of hardship,
see text at notes 64, 135 supra, and to render confidential advisory opinions to persons
covered by any of the conflict of interest statutes regarding what items must be disclosed
or what situations involve a conflict of interest.
143. Cf. WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.350 et seq. (1974), which creates a commission
charged with investigating whether disclosures have been made, WASH, REv. CODE
§ 42.17.360(4) (1974), and empowered to investigate and report violations of disclosure
requirements to the appropriate authorities, WASH. REv. ·coDE § 42,17,360(5), .3'10(3)
(1974), and to publicize alleged or apparent violations. WASH, REv. CoDE § 42,1'1.370(4)
(1974).
144. For example, the committee could be composed primarily of persons not in•
volved in government service and having occupations that are not substantially regulated
by the state and that do not involve substantial business with state or local governments.
145. For the distinction between appointed officials and public employees, sec note 7
supra.

March 1975]

Notes

779

and applicants for public employment. The state's interest in disclosure varies among these groups, however, and within each group
according to the role the public plays in the selection of the persons
covered, the type of supervision to which those persons are subject,
the degree of policy-making power or discretion over spending
those persons have, and the size of such spending programs. For example, the first two factors would justify requiring a less public
form of disclosure from public employees than from candidates and
elected officials. In the case of candidates and elected officials, public disclosure enables the electorate to make informed choices. In
the case of public employees, the interest in public disclosure is
much weaker because the public plays no direct role in the employees' selection, but limited disclosure to hiring and supervisory
authorities-either directly or through an ethics committee-is
clearly warranted. It might be argued that public disclosure is
needed even here in order to enable the public to exert pressure on
a lax bureaucracy, but the existence of a truly independent ethics
committee could serve the watchdog function without necessitating
such a major incursion into the privacy of public employees. In
addition, public scrutiny is less important in the case of public
employees because the public employee is subject to more systematic
supervision than the elected official, who is subject only to the unfocused scrutiny of an electorate composed of diverse and conflicting
interests. The public employee is directly responsible to a specific
person or governmental unit, and his actions are scrutinized in
periodic audits of his department.146
The state's interest in disclosure by appointed officials depends on
these same factors. For appointed officials whose appointment must
be ratified by the legislature,147 the state has an interest in public
disclosure because the legislature needs such disclosure in order to
make an informed vote on ratification, and the public needs full
disclosure-as it does with regard to all matters before the legislature-in order to make its opinions known to its representatives.
Where the legislature has no direct role in the appointment process,148 the public's indirect role in influencing the person or body
holding the appointive power may not justify full public disclosure,
especially where the appointee is subject to fairly systematic supervision.
Where a public official has little power over policy decisions or
146. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 21.66 (1967) (auditor general required to
report to governor quarterly on receipts and disbursements of "each and every state
institution or officer''). Elected officials-such as the Secretary of Stat-who head departments administering spending programs would also be scrutinized by such audits,
but most elected officials (e.g., legislators) would not be so scrutinized.
147. See note 7 supra.
148. See note 7 supra.
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spending programs, the state's interest in disclosure is very weak,
because the official cannot become involved in a significant conflict
of interest. Generally, the official on the state level has greater power
than the local official. The state's interest in disclosure is correspond•
ingly stronger in the former case. However, an official of a large
municipality may control very substantial sums of money.140 Some
states use income level as a way of determining which officials and
employees are important enough to warrant requiring disclosure,1 uo
but this device seems ill-fitted to that purpose. Such a test might well
require disclosure by a highly paid university professor who has little
policy-making authority.
As many state disclosure laws recognize,161 the state may have a
legitimate interest in disclosure of the financial affairs of family
members and close associates· of public officials and employees.102
In the absence of disclosure by such parties, a candidate or officeholder, for example, might be able to avoid disclosing an interest
in a corporation without entirely relinquishing actual control by
giving the stock to his spouse or minor children. In addition, it is
likely that financial ties of closely related parties, including business
partners, in effect constitute financial ties of the officeholder because
of the community of interests involved. The state's interest in disclosure by related parties depends on its interest in disclosure by the
principal party, although it is rarely as strong. The state interest
also depends on the closeness of the relation, because it probably
can be assumed that people in close kinship are most likely to be
influenced by each other's interests even where they do not legally
share their interests. Finally, the degree of legal or emotional control the official or employee can be expected to exert over the related
149. Where the size or importance of the local spending programs so warrant, the
city or county might impose its own financial disclosure requirements. New York City,
for example, has presented for the mayor's signature an ordinance requiring elected
officials (including the mayor, city council members, and borough presidents), candi•
dates for political office, and all public employees with income greater than $25,000
to file a statement of all sources of income over $1,000, gifts of over 5500, debts owed
of over $500, and investments or real estate holdings of over $20,000. Spouses are also
required to file. The statements are public, and there is a criminal penalty for failure
to comply with the requirement. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1974, at 1, 28, cols. 6, 4 (late
city ed.).
150. E.g., .ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 327(9)(i) (Supp. 1973) ($12,000 cut-off); Iu.. R.Ev. STAT.
ch. 127, § 604A-10l(i) (1973) ($20,000 cut-off).
151. E.g., ALA. CoDE tit. 55, § 327(19)(a)(i) (Supp. 1973) (requiring disclosure of income and investments of minor children and spouse of officeholder and, "to the best
of his knowledge," the name, address, and occupation of the officeholder's adult
children, parents, brothers, and sisters, and their spouses); CAL. GoVT. CODE§ 3700 (West
Supp. 1974) (requiring disclosure of stock holdings of spouse and minor children);
Iu.. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-102 (1973) (requiring disclosure of economic interests
of spouse or other parties only if "constructively controlled" by officeholder); WASH,
R.Ev. CODE § 42.17.240 (1974) (requiring disclosure of financial interests of "immediate
family").
152. See generally Comment, supra note 14, at 937.
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party is important. For example, spouses and minor children perhaps
are more likely to be used to mask financial ties than parents, adult
children, brothers and sisters, or business partners, because the officeholder probably can wield more sure control over spouses and minor
children through emotional or legal ties.153
These guidelines are necessarily quite general, and a legislature
must be accorded substantial discretion in making fine judgments
concerning the degree of disclosure to be required of each class of
persons. While some disclosure requirements undoubtedly will serve
to deter official abuse of conflict of interest situations, legislatures
should exercise restraint lest the burden of disclosure discourage
qualified citizens from entering public service. Whether or not
they are constitutional, disclosure statutes will be workable only if
they strike a balance between public and individual interests.
153. Under the Uniform Gift to Minors Act the minor can be given "indefeasibly
vested legal title to the security, money or life insurance given," UNIFORM GIFT TO
MINORS Acr § 3, but the custodian, who may be the parent, has full legal power to sell,
invest, or dispose of the property. UNIFORM GIFT TO MINORS Acr § 4. See, e.g., MICH.
Cor.n>. LAws ANN. §§ 554.453-.454 (1967). The spouse's separate property, h01~ever, is
entirely under his or her control. See, e.g., CAL. Clv. CODE§§ 5107-08 (West 1970); MICH.
Cor.n>. LAws ANN. § 557.1 (1967).

